



Solidarity and Public-Participatory Budgeting: possible conditions to a Critical Theory?

Solidariedade e Orçamento Público Participativo: condições possíveis para uma Teoria Crítica?

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Resumo: Do ponto de vista da teoria crítica, que prevê três etapas processuais de estudo e pesquisa, análise, diagnóstico e correção, e que também dialoga com a ontologia social, a filosofia social e a crítica social, podemos situar a esfera da ontologia social – o objetivo desta pesquisa é a investigação da natureza da realidade social, dos indivíduos e em particular das instituições sociais em relação a questão do orçamento público participativo (OPP cuja sigla em inglês é PPB) – como importante espinha dorsal para uma pesquisa crítica. Nesse sentido, a gênese constitutiva do PPB está ancorada nos pressupostos subjacentes de uma teoria crítica que permite emergir a solidariedade como possibilidade de pesquisa entendida como expressão de um pensamento crítico visando à emancipação pautado no PPB. Neste artigo, pretendo explicitar, brevemente, o entrelaçamento entre a solidariedade e o Orçamento Público Participativo como espaço fundamental para uma pesquisa crítica.

Palavras-chave: Teoria Crítica. Ontologia Social. Orçamento Público Participativo.

Abstract: Concerning the point of view of the critical theory which provide for three procedural stages of study and research analysis, diagnosis and correction, and that also dialogues with the social ontology, social philosophy, and social critique, we can set out the sphere of social ontology – means in this paper the research of the nature of social reality, of individuals and in particular of social institutions as is the issue about the public-participatory budgeting (PPB) – as important backbone to a critical research. In this sense, the constitutive genesis of PPB is berthed with the underlying assumptions of a critical theory allowing to arise the solidarity as a possibility of research understood as an expression of a critical thinking aiming to the emancipation mainstreamed with the PPB. In this paper I aim explicit in short the intermingling between solidarity and a Public-Participatory Budgeting as a fundamental room to a critical research.

Keywords: Critical Theory. Ontology Social. Public-Participatory. Budgeting.

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Introduction

I tried elsewhere (ASSAI, 2015, p. 226 – 244) to put forward the social-normative deficit Honneth presenting limits of honnethian social thought regarding their actualization of Law's Hegel Philosophy – while acknowledging progress in the critical reading of Honneth – more specifically like a normative question of social institutions (“how”, “what” before solving social pathologies). I tried to explicit this *deficit* left by Honneth when he mentions that the ontological and social argument is an opportunity to respond to the critical Kantian about the alleged “contextual blindness” from Königsberg philosopher regarding social issues and it becomes a response alternative because of doing this in the rational framework of (inter) subjectivity. In this sense, the reason understood as embodied associates, so to speak, to the reality of social understanding process and therefore heuristic and fundamental assumption becomes the articulation of a way of thinking Critical Theory (CT). It isn't enough that the reason is understood like “*detranszendentalisierte*”; but by this process, it should also be embodied so that one can take seriously the issue of social contexts and the resolution of their problems. The continuous efforts of the “Frankfurt School” in adjectives reason and specifically Honneth to mention the status “social-ontological” led me to suspect that this effort carries or brings out problems and new possibilities of thinking own CT without taking it what is most important from the constituent genesis of the “first generation” until today. One such problem is why do not you make CT explaining his mediation in an ontic-social substrate (textual legacy “left behind” by Honneth and not deepened by him)?

I don't aim to create a “fad” or “a new foundation” to the Critical Theory; however, before the question the status that is common to philosophical work, raise an investigation on the normative foundations of a way of thinking and doing Critical Theory and this, submit a proposal for research in social philosophy which is able to think all the wealth and limits also the CT mediated social assumption of ontological matrix. Divergences and other criticisms are important in this continuous process of maturing and (dis)construction; but on the other hand, it should also be daring which is one of the most fundamental characteristics of philosophical knowledge.

Contextualizing the research.

As stated by Paul Kjaer (KJAER, 2015, p. 312 – 318), the “Last of the Mohicans” of CT about a line of investigation more geared to the guiding principles of the early critical research in Frankfurterian circle – Hauke Brunkhorst – has presented his research at a constant assumption update task CT to (re)thinks herself as philosophical knowledge and according to Marcos Nobre

The Critical Theory does not intend to present a “more adequate explanation” of how capitalism works. It aims to understand the present time in view of overcoming its logic of domination.

Hence its critical character just “understands” how “things work” is already accepting that these “things” are well and that can’t be radically differently (NOBRE, 2008, 80p.)

The Kjaer adjective given to Brunkhorst don’t seems pointless, and on the other hand, the understanding of Marcos Nobre seems to guide us not only to the relevant critical Brunkhorst to Fraser; however, to rethink why not be taken seriously a social ontological assumption to a research bounded with a social philosophy. The honnethian deficit that I have outlined elsewhere allows us to at least ask the Honneth where explicit of this ontological substrate of a social nature. My philosophical inquiry lies at this point (in the absence of such social ontological argument as a medium possible to think of a normative critical ability) and to explain it, first I want to present, briefly, the honnethian thinking about thought normative of CT and its potential social deficit on “*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*”(2). Thereafter, and as a counterpoint to this first question, I wish to present the concept of solidarity in Brunkhorst (BRUNKHORST, 2002, 246p.) in response trial to my inquiry about the “ontological-social argument” and that is established, as it were, as answer alternative to honnethian limit concerning the normativity think about social institutions both “*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*” and Habermas limit on the relationship between the world of life and the public sphere (2.1 and 2.2). Here, the case of social institutions arise from two questions: first, the challenge of the public sphere that is treated by Brunkhorst as “effective” even being weak in the current scenario of institutional policy more global level (there is disagreement on this issue between Brunkhorst and Nancy Fraser, for her the public sphere should be weak and Brunkhorst a weak public sphere does not mean being ineffective); the second question concerns the Habermas’ understanding of communicative power (which isn’t limited only in the formal aspect). In this case, the concept of solidarity in Brunkhorst brings the idea that communication can’t be only a formal frame, but it is also normative (*Problemlösung*) because it has the task to propose solutions to the social pathologies (according to honnethian language). I’ll conclude this brief article taking over the first point to clarify the relevance of social-ontological argument, “left behind” by Honneth, taking a stand in favor as the ontic-social assumption in search of Critical Theory from a way of political-democratic participation that has the audience-participatory budgeting as a protagonist and social actor (3).

Critical Theory without “Sozialontologische Argument”?

borderline condition in Honneth

On “*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*” (HONNETH, 2001, 127p.) Honneth says about requirement to a “social-ontological argument” (*sozialontologisches Argument*) to think the social institutions under the Hegelian perspective; however, I believe that the former Director of the Institute for Social Research

to do a reinterpretation of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* inflates his critique to Kant. Critique from Honneth to Kant based on *“der Kontextblindheit [...] den bei der Anwendung, des kategorischen Imperativ bleibt es solange orientierungslos und leer, wie es nicht gewisse normative Vorgaben aus denn institutionalisierten Praktiken seiner Umwelt heranzieht”* – but this criticism needs further explanation on the part of Honneth himself what he meant by this “social-ontological argument” in response to the alleged Kantian myopia. This argument didn't explicit on *“Leiden an Unbestimmtheit”* and this creates problems, in my opinion, to face, for example, the economic issue on *“Der Wert des Marktes”* (HERZOG, 2014, 670p.) because I believe it is little defensible didn't consider the ontological-social argument assumption when it comes the economic issue taking as normative *telos* to emancipation. What now follows the new “generation” of Critical Theory is at least the suspension of the term for research to social philosophy. I want to return, first, the two main arguments of critics Honneth.

On *“Leiden an Unbestimmtheit”* Honneth asks himself how (what conditions) *“Freie Wille”* gives the individual his self-realization. For him, such process is only effective upon the communicative structures of ethnicity which requires two things: have a space so there is a subject of learning as the bearer of rights and propose a moral order for people to self-conceive as subjects of a conscience individual. Except that here Honneth presents the first argument to address the institutional issues: and returning Hegel, Honneth criticizes against Kant, stating that it paralyzes a social concept aimed at emancipation “of a loss-making company” because it is “blind” to the contexts and secondly, that to “cure” - social pathology - this blindness to therapy being proposed rules is the prerogative of institutionalization that takes into account the reasonable and rational facts. By Honneth, the Kantian moral autonomy doesn't help into understanding how a subject comes to a rational action because the categorical imperative applied to action is “empty” (blind) as the social actor doesn't betake the normativity already located in the institutionalized practices (family, corporations, and the State Constitution). In this second argument, Honneth refers to the social-ontological assumption as the way to understanding the *“Verkörperung von Vernunft”* in social reality since, for him, Kant was shortsighted to social praxis.

To respond satisfactorily to the criticism of Kant, Honneth “bet their chips” in the institutionalized processes such as those that are binding upon its civil society and the state in the Hegelian reading. Thus, the Objective Spirit (social reality) is effected by the *“Will of Freedom”* in the use of *“Freie Wille”*; But even if Honneth take into account that “the world of modern life (objective spirit of Hegel) already contains a whole spectrum of interaction patterns that ensure the freedom [...] is called to this in a precise sense a function therapy at the moment they accept the interpretation offered an ethical content of their own world of life [...]” he doesn't explain how this lifeworld embodied in social institutions is based.

It is a fact that the life term world has gained, over time, so much meanings in the entourage of Critical Theory, and the strongest of adjectives is the world of social life, a philosophical effort not reserve it to a mere formal transcendentalism don't link as their ways of thinking social action and normativity; but, on the contrary, that the world of life makes yourself present in the facticity and not only as pure description but as something normative connected to the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*). It seems that the concept of modern life world, in Honneth language on "*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*", links up with regard to the self-realization of the subject process - while it is slipping away from a pure selfish "blind to reality" - space "conditional" (condition) for exercise and use of freedom with a telos to ethicity. In this case, I take into account that the "*Lebenswelt*" isn't far from a normative conception of political Public Sphere (which tries to account for the social contexts and problems); but rather, a constitutive part of this, this element may be related to the ontological-social argument that Honneth only outlines to submit it on "*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*". This link isn't immune from doubt and also criticism, but since two of the founding of the world aspects of life are already given by it "are" objectively to our subjectivity (culture and society), we can allow us to establish a relationship between the world of life and ontological-social substrate. What this relationship can offers us?

In attempt to thinking that what inheres to the normative constitution of the (inter) subjectivity must look at isn't only describe about the other components of the world of life (culture and society), but also consider that to overcome the pathological device (*Pathologischen Einstellungen*) in wich must emerge a space that presents itself as a normative force: the Public Sphere. In this own "space" are already built all assembly members belonging to the world of life more generally with at least two basic assumptions that require, at its own epochal context, confrontation of their proper evaluative claims: "*Grundgüter*" and "*Öffentliche Güter*". In this point, I agree with Honneth that these two elements (*Grundgüter* and *Öffentliche Güter*) would reinforce the thesis, under the normative form in the public sphere of the democratic state, the right to social existence (*soziale Existenzrecht*) and, in my point of view, it and together with the goods so fundamental as public, would be the argument of the core of a social ontology left by Honneth as "peripheral" key word on "*Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*". With these "new" elements of the world of life gains more justification of force (including normative empowerment) which leads us to think that the honnethian and Habermas' assumption of embodied reason - how much requirement for a Reason! - effective itself (*Verwirklichung*) in reconstructive dialectic and critical in (of the) society. In this sense, it would seem that Habermas would link the idea of the lifeworld to an ontic-social assumption as being the lifeworld "part of the objective world" it already has, according to Habermas himself, an ontological primacy (*ontologischen Primat*) social warp.

Summing up this first part on *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*, Honneth allows us to think that a theory of society, or more exactly a social philosophical thinking about social institutions must be mediated by social-ontological argument; But what I want to settle here is that Honneth doesn't makes clear what he meant by this "ontological-social argument." So, I think that there is a deficit of "how" and "(about) what" thinking about the institutions and not just "say" that you need to have them as mediators to coordinate actions. My critique concern so: Honneth would need to explain the "content" of ontological-social argument in the sense that how these institutions could be effective – a Hegelian language – as mediators action aimed at practice taking as a normative model of democracy deliberative. I think that I have explained the honnethian deficit as the ontological-social argument for building an idea about Critical Theory and a possibility by identifying and taking decisions (*Stellungnahmen*) guided by emancipation (social and economic).

On *Sittlichkeit Lehre als normative Theorie der Moderne*, which is the last part of *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*, Honneth refers to the shape of the cooperative practice, and is a fundamental point to understand the meaning of ethicity of the State, mentioning the public liberty (*Öffentlichen Freiheit*); but the freedom is only effective while public when it is inserted into the idea of a political public sphere (*Idee einer politischen Öffentlichkeit*) and through it can carry out the "institutional development of spaces of freedom" (*institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Freiheitsräume*). In this spatiality policy, which aims at continuous construction and exercise of freedom is that in my point of view, reinforces the thesis that it takes not only efforts, but models capable of carrying out such intent.

The search for these models is to continuously challenge a social philosophical research and thus to what Brunkhorst called "*Desozialisierung der Individuen*" which inheres to the colonization process of public sphere gives rise to what I'd call "desozialisierung" the lifeworld: to admit that society is an integral element of the lifeworld on the one hand; and, secondly, that same company is faced with problems to be solved in view of the lack of economic justice, social, political dimensions, emerges in itself not only the possibility, but the ways of a "must-be" that help it to an exodus tyrannical which undermines of the internal and external way. In this sense it is relevant to think the lifeworld both ontic as social form and thus can be put in question as repoliticizing the public sphere.

If we think the lifeworld of this dual form - the methodological and theoretical level – leads us to believe that it will become one of these emancipatory power models or as Habermas prefers to call in a *Raum der Gründe* (foundations claims that emerge from within the phylogenic order). In my view, I include the participatory budgeting that – building on its principal warp – may constitute a

procedural and decision-making ability in continuous critical task of repoliticizing the public sphere or otherwise, propose outputs to the process of “colonization of the public sphere” (*Kolonialisierung der Öffentlichkeit*). I should return to this issue later because what concern us now is the dealings of Brunkhorst with the public space, but first you must find traces of a normative rapprochement between the world of life and the public sphere. So, I think that Habermas’s student project centered on the idea of solidarity helps us in the realization of alternatives to the exercise of freedom in a democratic state thought inside the Critical Theory founded into ontological-social perspective.

Solidarity as vestige of a critical theory

A Critical Theory Research has itself most original scope of research the presence of the public sphere. But when we think about the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) is at the same time, in the understanding of Habermas and also honnethian Critical Theory, link it with the lifeworld and also postulate the thesis that it is confined to a community policy that claims for itself both the legitimacy normative and effectiveness policy. What foundation of unity among the public sphere and the lifeworld? So much repeated efforts by the “Frankfurt School” in describing the *Lebenswelt* - such as “social lifeworld”, “the modern lifeworld” etc. – seem to believe that the idea of the lifeworld isn’t yet finished; rather, it always seems to be in cooperative construction with the social knowledge (Brunkhorst) and economic knowledge (Honneth). This continuous qualifying process towards the public sphere is that we can identify not only be the public sphere, but, above all, its constitutive genesis associated with social praxis that is, in our issue, the ongoing task of repoliticizing political public sphere through the institutional agreements of the social order (arguing in favor of an ontic-social approach as a possible response to the process “*Entpolitisierung*” of the public sphere). The attempt to bring the *Lebenswelt* to a conception ontological and social seems too “allergic”, but I believe also, on the other hand, interesting investigative point for CT to be revisited.

This attempt to explain an ontological-social substrate in research in Critical Theory, first I want to address, very briefly, the development of the conception of the world of life and the public sphere in Habermas so that there can move to Brunkhorst contribution of concept Solidarity (unifying principle for a regulatory approach between lifeworld and political public sphere). It is to follow for the last part: a democratic research model that allows us to articulate, based on the above assumptions, a proposal for social praxis that considers an ontological-social approach.

On “*Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns*” (HABERMAS, 1995, 593p.) Habermas, to present his own concept of the lifeworld, explains it primarily as a transcendental place (*transzendente Ort*) detached from the normative

sphere. When Habermas gives *transcendental* features to the lifeworld – because Habermas himself would realize that the formulation TKH is insufficient for CT and therefore rearticulates his concept of lifeworld – he links the lifeworld with three matters, namely: the objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. Habermas admits, therefore, not only the existence of an objectively given world, but to admit the objectivity of a reality that is put in front of me (from Self), he presents an ontological substrate little underlined in his works. Also, in this *Sozialen Welt* (social world) the validity claims are confronted and produce a *telos* the understanding and at the same time, emerging conflict situations that aren't always oriented to mutual understanding, but rather, are already established by disagreements (*Pathologie Sozial*) which give rise us think the dealings resolution conflicts through institutional channels to take seriously the contextual conditions. The “bet” in the social lifeworld is, as it were, also claim the ontological-social argument “forgotten” in Honneth on *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*. On the other hand, in Habermas's theory of society the perspective of the participants (*Perspektiven der Teilnehmer*) is inflated and it can't take account for a social-economic background of “who is unable to participate in this discursive arena”. The historical situations of those who has nothing for their daily sustenance somehow are outside of the participation political and public. In this case, the “*Entpolitisierung*” process remakes itself of a way as well reifying as tantalizing to the point that Habermas bet consensus of stakeholders in the “*Discursive Rede*” haven't a foundation “more” normative in the sense of thinking about social problems and its emancipatory potential. Habermas seems to take account of this problem when link to social integration to the achievement a social space that actualizes through solidarity, but he didn't develop this theme - solidarity - on TKH from an institutional point of view. From the perspective of TKH, the process of socialization of the participants in the lifeworld finds difficult to carry out as emancipatory process because the action capabilities (*Handlungsfähigkeiten*) - encapsulated in an internal and external dynamics of the validity of claims the speech acts of social workers - are restrictive by still being designed, in my point of view, as a pure transcendental locus. The Reason – even embodied – is encapsulated about a “hard” communicative action theory of transcendental nature and whose dualism (lifeworld and system), and in this sense, the theory of society Habermas' also doesn't help towards an orientation to praxis. The challenge, therefore, I seek gradually is making an exodus this conception transcendental the lifeworld on TKH and migrate to a normative approach that seeks the most fundamental character of a critical research which is an emancipatory becoming without losing sight of the challenge the re-politicization of the process of public policy sphere. To accomplish the task of this paradigmatic exodus I believe, on the other hand, that we should take seriously the ontological-social argument that Honneth describes on *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit* establishing a connection

with a proposed model deliberative-procedural (also normative) that is close to the founding project of the Critical Theory.

The last lines of TKH, however, open a possible approach between binding lifeworld and the public sphere just as Habermas deals with the task of his theory of communicative action is to clarify the problems of social development. More than a decade later and from "*Fakzität und Geltung*" (HABERMAS, 1992, 704p.) – FG –, Habermas forecasts a concept of the lifeworld and the public sphere more linked with a normative conception than strictly historical-social-phenomenological present just before the TKH and more precisely from this most important work of Habermas, also doing this in other works that deal specifically on Reason and Public Sphere. On "*Fakzität und Geltung*" Habermas defines what he understands about *Öffentlichkeit* (such understanding is complementary at the TKH where here there's a little more concern to take account the public sphere linked with a normative claims):

[...] politischen Öffentlichkeit als seiner Kommunikationsstruktur, die über ihre zivilgesellschaftliche Basis in der Lebenswelt verwurzelt ist. Die politische Öffentlichkeit wurde als Resonanzboden für Probleme beschrieben[...] Öffentlichkeit läßt sich nicht als Institution und gewiß nicht als Organisation begreifen [...] Die Öffentlichkeit läßt sich am ehesten als sein Netzwerk für die Kommunikation von Inhalten und Stellungnahmen, also von Meinungen beschreiben [...]. Die Öffentlichkeit zeichnet sich vielmehr durch eine *Kommunikationsstruktur* aus, die sich auf einen dritten Aspekt verständigungsorientierten Handelns bezieht: weder auf die Funktionen noch auf die Inhalte der alltäglichen Kommunikation, sondern auf den im kommunikativen Handeln erzeugten sozialen Raum.

On also FG Habermas makes clear that the political public sphere is a rooted communication structure in the lifeworld; therefore, FG doesn't belong to a binding public sphere a normative role as the public sphere can't be understood neither as an institution and neither as an organization or system. My point of view aim to articulate a normative conception of the political public sphere rethinking critically the Habermas' legacy regarding the relationship between the lifeworld and the political public sphere. The public sphere on FG is "a network for communication content, positions and opinions" who carries think that while the public sphere constitutes itself as "only" a "*Resonanzboden*" can't be able to be the normative medium where the effectiveness of actions and communicative interactions take place for the realization processes and social efficiency. Here I think about the basic goods and public goods as basic requirements for a right to exist. It would be in this case that the institutions would occupy an important place in the decision making and procedural process for solving effectiveness of social pathologies. Then, the public sphere can't be thought of social-phenomenal

form baseless (*Gründe*). The lifeworld and the public sphere are elements of a single normative framework of thinking because one doesn't overlap each other although methodological way. If the public sphere binds only to the social space (*sozialen Raum*) unrelated with content (*Inhalte*) and functions (*Funktionen*) it is difficult to understand it detached from what it deserves in their normative selfconstitution. This conceptual argument is faced with what I propose in this research, because once there is nothing given as content or task while heuristic element of an underlying normativity – substrate of a social-ontological assumption – then this social space was overgrown guiding emptiness of meaning. Or, in another way, this meaning would occur in this case for membership now “right” that no content and no functions into the public sphere located in the social space? In a scenario of a society full of pathologies (structural unemployment, poverty and misery, lack of sanitation, structural system failed education etc.) there isn't “space” to think about a public sphere as a social space “empty”. Here, it seems that the criticism Honneth to Kant – to do the reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right – gains strength. It seems that this concept of the public sphere as a social space is a “myopic” way of thinking still serious contexts of social pathologies. I propose the idea of solidarity as an attempt to research the CT to address these above enrolled issues (mainly the search for a form of research on CT that considers an “ontological-social argument”) and, if so, will use the contribution of Hauke Brunkhorst. He doesn't an ontological-social theory but when we think of a way to carry out the democratic participation by one alternative of an ontological-social argument, I think the idea of solidarity can contribute strongly in this sense.

On *Solidarität*, Brunkhorst outlines – at the end of the first part (*Stufen der Solidarität*) – the three levels of solidarity. To define the concept of solidarity, Brunkhorst establishes a conceptual hierarchy that starts with the “civil friendship” through metaphysical and theological dimension of tradition Jewish-Christian to reach out the Human Rights from 1789. What interests us here is the core of his understanding of solidarity and, through it, and Brunkhorst understands about *Solidarität*, namely: the social achievements of the common good. And these achievements are associated with the idea of *Grundgüter* (basic goods) and public goods (*Öffentliche Güter*) which, if accomplished by the achievement of social praxis, translate through the canon of a normative form of the right to social existence (*soziale Existenzrecht*). If Brunkhorst talks about achievements this means that he evokes, a critical-dialectical reading, to the core of Critical Theory which is the identification of problems in a society and its potential resolution of the same challenges. Nobody conquers something purely for free. And in the wake of this way of thinking about winning, I believe that the resume amid the social-political skepticism of our reality social the trust in the institution (*Institutionenvertrauen*) as a democratic legislative procedure (*medium normative*) can be an attempt to

answer to the “*Entpoloitisierung*” process of the political public sphere and has as substrate the social-ontological medium “just left behind” by Honneth on *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit*. In this case, I propose the model of participatory democracy called public-participatory budgeting (3).

On “*Solidarität*” Hauke Brunkhorst explicits the Hegelian Thought leading up through the institutional issue. As Honneth, Brunkhorst also focuses on ethics as an ethical assumption able to provide normative before the social pathologies. On *Solidarität* Brunkhorst outlines the concept of solidarity starting from the Jacobin revolution through the modern democracy to reach the idea of solidarity limited to the public sphere and hence, ultimately, to the State (Human Rights and Constitutional State). Only that the solidarity itself has levels, stages, so to speak, to occupy in the social order and the first level is what Brunkhorst appoints *Bürgerfreundschaft* and it is precisely this first level already starts the dialectical path of ethicity, from the institutional point of view, to reach the State. Brunkhorst explains the transition from friendship (civil) which has the telos for ethics and that begins on *philia* through the *politike philia* and reaches the *Politeia*. That’s why to Brunkhorst the *philia* doesn’t only brings an epistemic idea, but mainly political (read here also political and participatory). And in this political sphere that is the locus more substantially the central proposition of my research: solidarity isn’t rooted just only a volitional sense to help our neighbor; however, it is present because we operate in a social warp that requires mutual cooperation of participants for life in society. Solidarity, in this case, requires participation and therefore also we participate through institutional means of “progress” corporate. In short, Brunkhorst supports the idea that the concept of *philia* (*Bürgerfreundschaft*) is anchored on three levels: political, public and legal.

Brunkhorst outlines two central problems since modern societies: *Desozialisierung der Individuen* and *Proletarisierung der Gesellschaft*. As regards the first (*Desozialisierung der Individuen*) concerns the individualization through the exclusion of the subject of the society. That’s what I call of *Desozialisierung* process, that is, the first process occurs when the individual is faced on a process of “*Zerrissenheit*” through the social sphere, economic and political. On the other hand, Brunkhorst calls of *Proletarisierung der Gesellschaft* – corresponds to what I would call desphylogeny process – addresses the problem of social inclusion that isn’t effective because of the compelling logic of capital and this process is the corollary of social pathologies (second process) that affront the life completely (disarticulation of the labor market, miss the real gain etc.). Brunkhorst shows us a possible solution to these two problems: the consolidation of the democratic constitutional state with a strong public sphere.

Public Sphere as regards the understanding of Brunkhorst can’t be understood as something that is static, but, on the contrary, it is dynamic in

its own constitution. And this element that gives dynamism is based, according to Habermas's reading, communicative force (here Brunkhorst approaches Habermas) based on engagement and openness (to issues and debates aimed at conflict resolution) as the criteria of legitimacy at public sphere. Engagement means increasing effectiveness of decision-making mechanisms (participatory-democratic) and for society; in this case, the procedural pathway mediated by institutional channels can still be a plausible alternative. To Brunkhorst, the institutionalization should be seen as the medium of freedom, I understand about the realization of freedom itself like a possible mediation and above all the strengthening (primarily normative and not just only a "rigging" of a bureaucratic-institutional channel) of those institutional channels. Here I think also about the original Brazilian model of public-participatory budgeting. It can still give good reasons (foundations) to us think about social project. Solidarity action invites to propose foundations (*Gründe*) to the cosmopolitan society also having as basic reference the local context drastically changing their *modus vivendi* to improve the social context.

I want to advance, *prima facie*, that the term participatory budgeting is target of criticized and when you talk about as soon as shows regional and empirical references and their methodological and systematic nature of difficulties; but also I am aware that it is complex to deal with a pure principled the idea of Public-Participatory Budgeting because if we dichotomizes its empirical references this wouldn't help about understanding of a *Sollen*. On the other hand, it is primarily possible don't fix to the terminological content, because about a scope of a dynamic society is perfectly plausible the changing of projects such social, administrative, economic, etc. In this article, I focus the term public-participatory budget and secondly, my concern in this article is to revisit a proposal for a project (that doesn't come "from above") who applies to repoliticization task of the political public sphere, and this case, I think is important deepen its reasons. Without forgetting the empiricals discrepancies, I'll outline only the principles of public-participatory budgeting and its relationship to the task of a TC that arises as an alternative through a construction of a political public sphere.

Public-Participatory Budgeting (PPB) as mediation to a Critical Theory

The Public-Participatory Budgeting (PPB) (NETO, 2009, 159p.) has in its founding genesis one fraught history of struggle for the achievement of the social stratum to participation towards democratic effectiveness. I don't want to limit myself here to the historical contexts (historical backgrounds) that engendered it, but this that I propose here; however, from its creation, or even before, the Brazilian national state is a witness in his own history of achievements and struggles to a democratic effectiveness and that, from the point of view of a political philosophy, constitute processes and They are based on principles produced by its

own history (*Rahmenbedingungen*). The PPB became one of the possible ways to democratize the democracy in order to counteract of the disruptive process that occurs in the political public sphere and under Honneth language are the social pathologies. I think a concept that demonstrates synthetically, and many other concepts, what is an PPB is the following:

Participatory budgeting is an important complementary instrument of representative democracy by allowing the citizens discuss and define the destiny of a city. In it, the people decide the priorities for investment and services to be performed each year, with funds from the municipality budget. Besides, it stimulates the exercise of citizenship, people's commitment to the public good and shared responsibility between government and society on the city management (NETO, 2009, p.67 – 68).

On the PPB counts both principles and the nature which are outlined through

participation is open to all citizens without any special status attributed to any organization, including community organizations; combination of direct and representative democracy creates an institutional dynamic gives the participants themselves the definition of the internal rules and assumptions; allocation of funds for investments based on a combination of general and technical criteria, in other words, compatibility decisions of participants, technical criteria and financial limits. As regards the nature is constituted by making and popular sovereignty embodied in the notion of public deliberation; decision on the whole of the municipality budget; accountability and transparency for effective social control of decisions; accountability and transparency for effective social control of decisions; delimitation of a decision process, by society and the State, a body of specially elected representatives to decide the allocation of resources (NETO, 2009, p.69).

The structure of the PPB can relate as a normative component of the political public sphere as it brings together the autonomy, participation, and deliberation as synthesizers elements of all aspects concerning both nature and the principles. This conception is directly related to a way of thinking about representative democracy within a Constitutional State. We can't lose sight of the "how" as do the empirical questions - by the Brazilian experience - were and continue to be on matter of discussion and controversy both under the administrative and fiscal point of view or and from the perspective moral. Only to our discussion here, I retain me for the possibilities of investigating the foundations of this normative proposal. Thus, about Social Philosophy – which also think about the institutional mediation of the political and social arena - the PPB also relates to the proposal from the active participation of the social actors who engage in their societies in order to improve their own living conditions. Such understanding seems close to what Habermas outlined about "institutionalized speech" at the level of political communication.

It's true that Habermas cites this type of speech from the perspective of his theory of communicative action and this entails a concentrated theoretical elaboration to account for his own theory along with its assumptions; however, take account TKH, Habermas supports the contributions both Schutz and Mead, among others, seeks to link the linguistic medium with to social action. In this sense, the social act associates itself internally and from the point of view of a normative ground, to the solidarity act describes, for example, Brunkhorst. The matter here is both philosophers and the sociologists, more precisely to those who are circumscribed to the context of a Europe fraught of arguments against in favor of the UE, their research much have focused your own nowadays. In case of a Critical Theory that purposes itself to be considered also having as reference to social reality of local character and not just (post)national task also becomes a key challenge because the research references (social movements, participatory budgeting etc.) aren't as evenly massive inside of Philosophy researched inside from Brazil as those carried out under the same theme, in the social sciences.

When the PPB shall be considered, under the critical-reflective aspects of the CT, for a way of doing social philosophy with our Brazilian context in question, we can associate it with the ontological-social substrate before argued. How is this possible? The social point of view, the PPB is located on a structural platform society as a social movement – though legal and institutional – to constitute a training group (for something specific with a strong appeal to non-disruption of society in which, on your turn, is embedded in the political public sphere of a certain world of life) and that conceives itself as a social phenomenon; On the other hand, under the ontological approach, the PPB, while his principles content and recognizes itself through the institutional warp, self conceives as a constituent part of the history of a class society (*konstitutiven einen Teil der von Geschichte klassengesellschaften*). The basic idea in this regard is which the History is only effective while history if social movement and hence the purely political character of the PPB. The public aspect of the PPB is that the social actors are own addressed of a project towards a social praxis. They themselves are referencing itself from the perspective of participation. Participation isn't only part of a community, however, act to the effectiveness of social justice. Hence the concept of social movement can't be confused with the PPB but is broader as it includes any initiative of a community that aims to improve it as a community. In this sense, the PPB, under a perspective from a social philosophy could be a participant of a specific form of social movement because consist in as a circle of normative effectiveness (*normative Wirkungskreis*). The effectiveness is associated with the process of realization of the exercise of freedom as reading Honneth and further Brunkhorst (institutional issue becomes the medium of freedom) and for social action becomes effective in our society the PPB becomes a normative and practical idea (the empirical issues are booked elsewhere)

as a decision-making institutional-procedural mediation (*Entscheidungsverfahren*) in the public political sphere. The PPB, in this perspective, contains the three elements of decision-making (political, administrative, and legal) and is precisely in the political (also as medium normative) arena that the PPB is related philosophically with the ontological-social substrate. Here, the Reason comes up as a *detranszendentalisierte Vernunft* itself and embodied becoming thinking and social action. The Reason undresses its unique transcendental platform and gives way to a form “actualization” to fix a lifeworld that isn’t only phenomenal, but also social. The “*soziale Lebenswelt*” assumes a normative connotation no longer transcendental, but because he is part of society is participant of a public sphere. This, in time, gains the political status (political public sphere) if, and only if, assumes of being an agent of transformation.

The PPB has in its normative *telos* critically search for first in its corporate base the *Grundgüter* (basic Goods) and *Öffentliche Güter* (public Goods) of its own actors and on the other hand, don’t taking his concept of solidarity action. According to Brunkhorst the solidarity is realized through the creation of decision-making mechanisms that obviously need another medium – the Law – for the continuous updating of his action. Once again, the social lifeworld is renewed in its deepest normative constitution, for the fruitful task of politicizing again the public political sphere doesn’t vanish while there is this “spirit that is guided by rules (norms)” – including procedural, decision-making coming from the institutional process of social order – to bear in mind one *Platzhalter* in participatory democracy. The OPP has its political side to settle such possible democratic participatory *Platzhalter*.

I think Honneth wasn’t mistaken to present the “*Sozialontologische Argument*” on *Leiden an Unbestimmtheit* to explain the effectiveness of the exercise of freedom before a hegelian reinterpretation. Only he didn’t develop this argument. I think a hard task that is the repeated attempt of critical research in a CT that I am here introducing minimally provokes new questions and statements from critics; but it is precisely the philosophical work. I’m aware that the issue isn’t finite and is open heuristics and critically way I reiterate the argument that can be indeed possible to CT taking into account an ontological-social approach taking into account the institutional aspect that is inherent to a social and ontological approach which, in other words, is also constituted as of a normative medium understanding; but that is another issue to be discussed later.

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