A primazia da alma em Durandus de St. Pourçain

The primacy of the soul in Durandus de St. pourçain

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between body and soul in the process of human knowledge according to Durand of St. Pourçain in In II Sent [A], dist. 3, q. 5 e In II Sent [C], dist. 3, q. 6. Overdue to the ontological hierarchy principle, Durand affirms that corporeal capacities cannot operate upon the intellectual act. Therefore, Durand denies the necessity of species informing the possible intellect with the accidental form of the sensible object. For him, there are no subjectively received species in the intellect, because, naturally, the intellect possesses the capacity to know its proper object. The internal sensible organs are capable of elaborate the affections and store a content that could be a possible object of intellectual attention, since soul and body are united. However, the capacity of attention is an intellectual capacity. Thus, this intellectual operation, and anything else, triggers the intellectual process. Accordingly, intellectual cognition must be a completely active capacity. In this regard, I argue that objective and subjective presence are fundamental notions to his cognitive theory.

Keywords: Vital act, knowledge, objective presence, subjective presence, relation.