Emotions as an analytical category and their use in public debate

The case of envy

Abstract

In this article, I discuss some implications of accusations of envy in public debate and for struggles for recognition, as well as the use of emotions as an analytical category for social diagnosis. Engaging in a dialogue with Axel Honneth, I begin by examining the nature of emotions, which have a cognitive aspect that may involve normative judgments. Such judgments occur, for instance, when a person feels indignant but also when they attribute envy to someone else. Thus, when those advocating for equality are labeled as envious in debates about redistribution, there is an underlying normative assumption—albeit concealed—that any redistribution is unjust. The attribution of envy in such cases, as I argue in the text, is primarily used to delegitimize an opponent without addressing their arguments, with significant repercussions for the struggles for recognition. At the end of the text, I reflect on when it is appropriate to use emotions such as envy as analytical categories, including in the diagnosis of social pathologies.